U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era: How to Win America's Wars in the Twenty-First Century by Glenn J. Antizzo

Author:Glenn J. Antizzo [Antizzo, Glenn J.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Political Science, Military, General
ISBN: 9780807136423
Google: hj_QwAEACAAJ
Goodreads: 7762813
Publisher: LSU Press
Published: 2010-06-01T00:00:00+00:00

ASSESSMENT

UNITAF, which represented the initial American intervention, was generally quite successful. President Bush had outlined only two goals, and they were largely fulfilled. The first was to create a secure environment for relief operations. As early as February 1993, it was clear that UNITAF was having its intended positive effect regarding this objective. Ports and airports in Mogadishu and southern Somalia were secured, greatly facilitating increased shipments of food, medicine, and other relief supplies. Likewise, virtually all supply routes through south and central Somalia were cleared and made usable. Furthermore, bandits had all but disappeared from Mogadishu. The looting of relief supplies was stopped.

As a result of the success of these military operations, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was able to engage in various public works projects. Perhaps the most important indicator of American success was that the number of deaths due to starvation dropped dramatically. In sum, U.S. forces succeeded in establishing a secure environment for relief efforts in areas where American troops had been deployed (Makinda, 1993: 74).

The other official American objective—the rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces after the establishment of the “secure environment”—was accomplished during the spring of 1993, culminating with the turning over of operations in Somalia to the United Nations in May.

Despite clashes between American troops and Somali gunmen, casualty figures remained quite low. As a result, and as long as that remained true, U.S. public opinion viewed the UNITAF operation as having an acceptable cost politically. This is to say that there were a sufficiently low number of casualties in relation to the minimal (in terms of the nation’s vital interests) importance of the objectives pursued.

Although some relief agencies claimed that American officials had attempted to cover up Operation Restore Hope’s alleged “failure” in order to hasten the pace of the U.S. withdrawal, when considered in terms of fulfilling the objectives originally set by Washington, the mission was a success (Keesing’s, February 1993: 39308). It is interesting to note also that many of the relief workers who originally complained about UNITAF eventually came to see it as a success and requested that it stay longer (Makinda, 1993: 74).

UNOSOM II, the United Nations’ successor mission to UNITAF, is generally considered a failure. Starting with the ambitious goal of rebuilding the Somali nation, it rapidly degraded into little more than a manhunt for General Aidid.

The mission was originally conceived as a new type of UN operation: peacekeeping with the power to use force to ensure the fulfillment of Security Council resolutions. It was, however, handicapped from the start. Despite its unprecedented enforcement authority, in terms of both its armaments and manpower quality, UNOSOM II was substantially inferior to the U.S. force that it replaced. Although a quick reaction force was available to assist UNOSOM II, it remained under an American command.

The original mandate of UNOSOM II was to cover all of Somalia. In practice, however, it never succeeded in doing so. UNOSOM II’s effectiveness largely remained confined to southern and central Somalia. The cause of this immobility was twofold.

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